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Michael Issacharoff. Discourse as Performance. Stanford: Stanford Univer- 
sity Press, 1989. vii + 161 pp. 
In Discourse as Performance, a revision and translation of his Le Spec- 
tacle du discours (1987), Michael Issacharoff studies the specificity of 
theatrical language (in the broad sense of signifying matter). Using mainly a 
corpus of over one hundred French, British, and American works from the 
nineteenth and twentieth century, focusing on the text of the play (the locus of 
inscription of its virtual performance) because of its status as the one con- 
stant element in what we call theater, combining theoretical speculation and 
synthesis with critical interpretation and analysis (eight of thirteen chapters 
are devoted to the discussion of individual plays), and adopting a semiotic 
point of view, Issacharoff examines dramatic speech ("dialogue" as well as 
didascalia or stage directions and notations identifying utterer and place of 
utterance), theatrical space and its interaction with onstage speeches (in 
particular, the constraints it imposes on them in non-comic drama), and 
theatrical language which undermines these constraints and frees itself from 
them. 
More specifically, after defining dramatic language as the distinctive 
theatrical use of verbal utterances and nonverbal elements such as gesture, 
facial expression, costume and decor, Issacharoff dedicates the first part of 
his book to the exploration of the nature and context of onstage speech acts 
(an exploration enriched by a study of lonesco's Les Chaises), the discus- 
sion of different classes of didascalia and their functions, and the investiga- 
tion of theatrical intertextuality and its dynamics (with Eugene Labiche's 
Raversin et Couverture and Tom Stoppard's Thavesties as prime examples). 
In the second part of the book, Issacharoff distinguishes between mimetic 
space, which is represented onstage and seen by the audience, and diegetic 
space, which is described through dialogue and has a merely verbal exis- 
tence. He scrutinizes their mode of operation and gives his examination an 
empirical basis by analyzing the dialectic of the visible and the invisible in 
Satre's Huis-Clos, the role and functioning of sequestration and reference in 
Les Sequestres d'Altona, the way in which spatial configuration governs and 
underlines the thematic dimensions of Jean Tardieu's La Cite sans sommeil. 
In the third and final part, Issacharoff pursues his characterization of theater's 
specificity by concentrating on those transgressions of spatial and referential 
conventions that occur in comic and experimental plays. He chooses 
Labiche's Un Chapeau de paille d'Italie to study the subversion of reference 
in a referentially unstable theatrical world; he shows how the hierarchical 
arrangement of codes governs the semiotic mechanisms of theater and iso- 
lates the distinctive semiotic features of comedy through an analysis ofJarry's 
Ubu roi and Ionesco's Jacques ou la soumission; he demonstrates the 
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fundamental role that elimination (of elements such as dialogue, movement, 
or character) and juxtaposition (of elements that are incompatible or incon- 
gruous) play in avant-garde drama; and he brings out the affinities of the latter 
with comic theater. 
Discourse as Performance does much more than my summary can 
convey. It not only succeeds in capturing much of the essence of theatrical 
language; it also, for example, sheds light on some of the differences between 
the "oral," vocal, and visual intertextuality peculiar to theater (one that has 
been studied very little) and the written (more purely "literary") kind; it iso- 
lates the characteristics of farce; and it illuminates the functioning of the indi- 
vidual plays it examines (in particular, it shows that-with a play like Les 
Sequestres d'Altona-Sartre, far from being indifferent to theatrical innova- 
tion, displays considerable originality). 
Of course, one might disagree with a few of Issacharoff's propositions or 
developments. For instance, I am not sure that, in order to be the addressee of 
a message, one must be allowed to respond to it through the channel it 
borrowed (9). I do not think that the dramatic script is essentially more 
"stereophonic" than other forms of literary discourse (17): if it is true that the 
dramatist's voice is heard in the didascalia, it is also true that the latter are not 
necessary to a dramatic script (there are or can be plays with one character 
only and s/he-or the place of her/his utterance-does not need to be identi- 
fied); besides, isn't a novelist's voice, say, heard at least in the title of the 
novel? I also do not believe that mimetic space is necessarily static (68). 
Finally, I would have wanted Issacharoff to discuss the possible role of smell 
(or touch, or taste!) in space onstage. 
But this is carping. Discourse as Performance is both a splendidly 
enlightening text about modern drama and an outstanding contribution to the 
semiotics of theater. 
Gerald Prince 
University of Pennsylvania 
Thomas M. Kavanagh, ed. The Limits of Theory Stanford: Stanford Univer- 
sity Press, 1989. 254 pp. 
The idea for the collection of the eight essays published together here 
grew out of a series of lectures organized by Thomas M. Kavanagh (Univer- 
sity of Michigan) at the University of Colorado at Boulder, during 1985 and 
1986. According to the latter, the common idea shared by the authors of the 
essays is "that there is a limit beyond which the drive to theory becomes 
something quite different from what it presents itself as being." 2




In his Introduction, Kavanagh outlines the background against which the 
theoretical project had developed, from the concerns of structuralism to the 
post-structuralist reactions. The plural spelling of "reactions" is not an acci- 
dent but, instead, it is a reflection of one principal characteristic of post- 
structuralism: the explicit rejection of theories pretending to universality. 
From such a situation arises the fact that since each theoretical enterprise 
gains recognition owing to acquiescence to its discourse, this discourse is 
often pushed to its limits by those whose desire it is to fmd a resolutely dif- 
ferent scheme. The essays gathered here, each written by renowned theoreti- 
cians, help understand the limits of theory by pointing at some of its 
characteristics. 
Michel Serres "Panoptical Theory" considers the sight of theory, how it 
works, what it does and to what needs it responds. The notion of sight is 
developed by making use of Greek mythology where Panoptes, the all-seeing 
god, is defeated by Hermes the messenger god who puts all his eyes to sleep by 
playing his flute. Hermes' victory marks the superiority of the message to that 
of what is to be seen, because when there is something to be seen there is a 
presence which is recognized. As is the case of the melodious air which forces 
the lucid viewer to sleep, our hearing encloses us, we cannot fmd the melody 
but we cannot avoid its presence, whether our eyes are closed or open. The 
abundance of sounds from the ones who insist on the extreme aspect of their 
theoretical musings and who, at the same time, base their theories on sites 
whose visibility remains fuzzy at best, thus defeats those who attempt to 
detect things behind the text. 
Vincent Descombes' "Quandries of the Referent" examines the claim 
that the referential function of language is an "illusion." The passage from the 
object to the referent as the focus of discussion may not have as significant a 
progress as its advocates indicated. The notion of referent, became muddled 
owing to the multiple meanings assigned to it by theoreticians. By using the 
apologue of the cloakroom, where one exchanges one's garment for a ticket, 
Descombes draws our attention to the fact that the ticket may become a sign 
for the garment but also a symbol, thus denying that certain items may serve 
as symbols while others may serve as signs. Distorted notions of the sign have 
been introduced by theoreticians who needed these in order to maintain their 
allegiance to theoretical models whose establishing lemmas lacked clarity. 
The representations that theory attempts are, undoubtedly those of the 
real but, according to Clement Rosset's "Reality and the Untheorizable," the 
real resists its absorption within the representative systems elaborated to 
figure it. It is easy to imagine that no image of the real may give us more than 
the real itself, nor can it give us a more easily understandable image. Malcolm 
Lowry's Under the Volcano is used by Rosset to show that, after a while, 
there exists no difference between total indetermination and total determina- 3
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don; that the drunk Consul's aimless wandering may also be seen as a clearly 
focused advance towards a goal not seen through an untraced path. Absolute 
stochasticity of the real thus becomes as unlikely as its absolute universal 
design. Such a view of the real as forever singular and individual-called 
"idiotic" by Rosset-calls to a rejection of philosophy's plan to replace 
reality with verbal constructs and the resulting control of the real through our 
domination of these constructs. 
Francois Roustang's essay "On Reading Again" establishes a series of 
principles he feels must govern every act of reading. The first principle is that 
one must reread until the text can be broken into its basic components. The 
second principle is that a text has been respected when we have taken its 
totality into account (even though this feat remains unattainable most of the 
time, it may nevertheless be seen as a regulating principle). The third can be 
expressed as follows: rereading involves a certain violence on the part of both 
the text and reader (owing primarily to the author's duty to misguide the 
reader). The fourth principle is that the reading must reach the "point of 
horror" before understanding the text's source (the reader must go through 
the anguish and sufferings in which the author found the strength to create). 
The final principle is that a text's construction appears most clearly when the 
reader has managed to pass from the point of horror to the point of laughter 
(going from the anguish of creation to the joy of seeing its end result). These 
principles, once followed, make reading and rereading a cathartic process 
miming in reverse that of creation. 
Roy Roussel's essay "The Gesture of Criticism," considers two texts, 
Paul de Man's The Resistance to Theory, and Roland Barthes' A Lover's 
Discourse. For de Man, the resistance that frustrates the critical project 
comes from the persistence of the desire that first drew the critic to the work. 
For Barthes, love makes us experience desire but does not allow us to know it 
or name it. The lover (for Barthes) wants to understand, but rejects any under- 
standing that is resolved at the level of theory. These two poles are the ones 
that the critic attempts to reconcile when the latter claims to express both the 
absolute personal and the absolute transcendence of the personal. 
Josue Harari's essay "Nostalgia and Critical Theory" uses the example 
of Levi Strauss's Thistes 73-opiques (and particularly the last part of the work) 
to examine how theory is unconsciously elaborated. Levi Strauss's "The 
Apotheosis of Augustus," which he claims to have written in a kind of trance 
(which lasted for six days), may be seen as a mapping of the process. 
Augustus, who represents order, is to be made a god, while Cinna, who has 
gone on to live in the wilderness, represents disorder. According to Harari, it 
is not the eagle who is the true messenger of the gods but, instead, Cinna. Levi 
Strauss has constructed a model that is necessary to his own theoretical 
endeavor. 4




Kavanagh's own "Film Theory and the Two Imaginaries" examines the 
dual relation to the imaginary involved in any attempt at film theory. The 
semiology of film began as a theory of the text but evolved into a theory of the 
film not as text but as system. Film viewing is rooted in the unconscious 
imaginary of the viewer-as spectator. For the theorist, the pleasure of film 
theory is not rooted in a spectator's unconscious imaginary but, instead, in a 
kind of schizophrenia (a search for a master whose theory will sanction the 
theorist's own discourse; the model of Lacan's reading Freud is actively 
used). These two choices, the narcissistic surrender to spectatorial imaginary 
and the quest for identity with a Master, are equally dismal. The alternative 
resides in the critic's commitment to prolonging the scope and resonance of 
the question posed by the film itself. 
Rene Girard's concluding essay, "Theory and Its Terrors," lashes ("with 
a grain of salt"-adds Girard) at some of the recent developments in the 
growing influence of literary theory in the teaching of literature. In his 
presentation of the growth and development of literary theory, Girard 
addresses topics ranging from the origins and groundings of theory to its 
effects among professors vying for tenure and from the parallels between the 
way deconstructionism functions to the incompatibilities between the 
demands of an academic career and those of a meaningful intellectual life. 
These essays, each in its own perspective consider the current hegemony 
of theory within literary studies. The emergence of theory in the early 1970s 
was hailed as a new and more clearheaded way of approaching literary works. 
Instead of considering language as a reflection of something else, language 
was considered as self-sustaining. The promise of clarity and rectitude was 
seen as evident since theory could not (in the minds of its staunchest 
promoters) hide its own rhetorical underlyings. The development of theory 
during the 1970s led to the superseding of its opposition. But, to the surprise of 
those same defenders, theory came to occupy a situation very similar to that 
of the monoliths it had successfully overwhelmed. In addition, the animosi- 
ties and oppositions which developed between practitioners of theory, as well 
as the entrenchment of members of certain subgroups within the general 
domain of theory, have led to comparisons between the present state of theory 
and the state of things before theory ascertained its own rights. There are 
excesses committed in the name of theory as there are flawed claims made 
based on less-than-straightforward reasoning. There are limits to what theory 
can achieve and these limits are not always clearly understood. As the essays 
in the collection underline, some concepts cannot simply be left aside by 
serious theorists and others must be kept in mind when serious theoretical 
investigations are launched. 
Those of us who are familiar with the upheaval created by the axioma- 
tization movement of the sixties in the field of mathematics (as illustrated by 5
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the publications of N. Bourbaki-an alias used by mathematicians asso- 
ciated with the axiomatization movement) will undoubtedly be stricken by a 
sense of déjà-vu when they consider the upheaval of theory and the present 
situation in the humanities. It was not possible to completely reform the field 
of mathematics, but the axiomatization movement allowed for worthwhile 
endeavors. It is likely that the theoretical enterprise, once it is cleared of its 
least attractive appendages, will also allow for a renewal of its energies and a 
possible fulfillment of its own promises. But this state of things will not 
happen until the warnings mentioned in the essays found here are heeded. 
Andre J. M. Prevos 
Pennsylvania State University, Worthington Scranton Campus 
Wendy B. Faris. Labyrinths ofLanguage: Symbolic Landscape and Narra- 
tive Design in Modern Fiction. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1988. 242 pp. 
In this insightful study, Wendy Faris is simultaneously Theseus, 
Daedalus and Ariadne. As Theseus, she makes her way through a compli- 
cated subject, with a long history and a developed scholarship. As Daedalus, 
she shapes her material with skill and perspective. And as Ariadne, she 
successfully guides readers through a complex topic. The project is a vast one: 
to trace the role of labyrinths in literature and culture from the Middle Ages 
forward, with particular emphasis on how and why the labyrinth has become 
so prevalent in twentieth-century literature. There are individual chapters on 
Joyce, Butor, Robbe-Grillet and Borges, but her exploration also includes 
Gide, Durrell, Nin, Camus, Cortizar, Donoso, and Eco, as well as Derrida, 
gender roles, detective novels and labyrinth cartoons (which constitute a 
genre of their own). 
If the nineteenth-century novel saw itself as Stendhal's mirror carried 
along a roadside, modernism and post-modernism have found in the labyrinth 
their preferred image of writing, reading and thinking. Labyrinth symbolism 
has a long tradition. In the Middle Ages and Renaissance, it represented 
human beings' fallen state, with God's grace as Ariadne's thread, leading us 
to salvation. In the Enlightenment the labyrinth continued to represent the 
human condition, with stress on the need to find direction in a world without 
grace. Indeed, the polyvalence of the labyrinth seems to have made it infi- 
nitely adaptable to different contexts. A nexus of contradictions, it unites 
order and confusion; reason and passion; reassuring boundaries and terrifying 
imprisonment. It may be experienced as Theseus does-in time, as he wends 
his way diacronically through it. Or it may be known as Daedalus does, from 6




above, as a whole pattern. It can be lived in time or in space, but the space- 
time distinction is often blurred, as in contemporary physics, and this may be 
one reason why the image of the labyrinth appeals to a post-Einsteinian 
world. The path through a labyrinth is akin to the trajectory through an 
unfamiliar city, as Joyce, Butor, Robbe-Grillet and Borges have all demon- 
strated in their protagonists' initiatory journeys through cityscapes. Above 
all, the labyrinth has come to be an image of the very process of writing and 
reading. In our century, the labyrinth has been transformed from a myth to a 
narrative structure: "in addition to encountering the labyrinths in the texts, 
we confront the labyrinths of the texts. . . . The labyrinths of the novels match 
the labyrinths in the novels" (10-11). 
Faris sees Joyce's Ulysses as the pivotal work where the labyrinth 
changes from a symbolic motif to a structural component of fiction. The 
image of Dublin-as-labyrinth is accompanied and mirrored by a labyrinth of 
words. Readers of Joyce begin as Thesean explorers, trying to decipher the 
pattern of words; gradually, we become Daedalian co-creaters, designing our 
own progress through the text. This transformation of the reader from 
Theseus to Daedalus is surely one of the most significant developments of 
twentieth-century fiction. We are obliged to thread our way through texts 
where many paths are possible and where there are also dead ends; reading 
requires constant choices, interpretations, and anxieties. The Minotaur to be 
slain is "the labyrinth's resistance to yield a meaning" (80). 
In Borges' works, labyrinths represent the world, the passage of time, 
and works of art. They stand for cities, texts, thoughts, and the relations 
among all three. And they suggest the delicate balance between order and 
chaos. For Borges, the essential question-and fundamental mystery-is 
whether or not the labyrinth of the world has a center. If it does, we can be 
reassured (even with a Minotaur) that there is an order. But if the world does 
not have a center, it is chaos and, in Borges' words, "then yes we are lost" 
(98). Most of the writers examined in this study share Borges' fear that there 
may be no center, and that our labyrinthine world has not been mapped out in 
patterns by a Daedalian God. But they continue to use the labyrinth as a 
structure of quest or self-discovery, either inward or outward. 
Faris sees the "labyrinthification" (167) of twentieth-century narrative 
discourse as mimetic as well as metafictional. While writers explore the 
labyrinth of the world, they create a mirroring labyrinth of language. The 
great danger, of course, is that such works become hopelessly unreadable. 
"The labyrinth of the text excludes not only hostile but dull beings" (168); 
many of the works cited in her study are hardly read outside of universities. 
Faris perceptively compares the convoluted prose in some of these novels to 
labyrinths on cathedral floors that served as substitute penitential pilgrimages 
for Christians who were unable to journey to Jerusalem: "In the case of these 7
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textual itineraries, what sin are we expiating? Perhaps our assumption of easy 
access to the literary text fostered by the popularization of the novel in the 
nineteenth century" (168). But if such texts sometimes feel like forms of 
expiation, they are also forms of desire-ever postponing closure: "The 
labyrinthine space is the realm that is always beyond our reach and therefore 
the object of our desire, our curiosity, our investigation, and it is also, 
paradoxically, the trace of that very investigation" (194). With so much 
influence on our literature, our culture and our psychic lives, the labyrinth is a 
compelling subject of study, which Wendy Faris has the imagination and 
intelligence to confront in an admirable way. 
Carol Rigolot 
Princeton University 
Eve Tavor Bannet. Structuralism and the Logic of Dissent: Barthes, 
Derrida, Foucault, Lacan. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1989. 299 pp. 
Do we need yet another publicist for Lacan, Barthes, Foucault and 
Derrida, whose terms and tactics, for good or ill, have become commonplace 
among us? They are exciting to read and to write about, but unless a critic 
engages their works intensely and rigorously, either as advocate or adver- 
sary, it is not very illuminating to read about them. Eva Tavor Bannet's review 
of these authors is unexciting in this way. In other ways it is grossly 
misleading. 
We are in trouble as of the very first page. After providing a fervent 
disclaimer about the death of the self and of God, the absence of the author 
and the futility of language, Bannet states: "They use absence, death and 
carefully orchestrated silences as indicators of their form-giving presence and 
as affirmations of their desire for being, individuality and truth" (1). If that 
were Bannet's thesis about these authors, by way of recasting them in the 
mold of an existentialist humanism they archly repudiate, this book would 
indeed be a challenge to our habitual conception of them. But it only reflects 
habits of effusive formulation which are alien to these authors' radically nega- 
tive capability. As critics we do not have to subscribe to the latter in order to 
balk at a description like this: 
They not only sought to unmask and to displace the determinisms and 
the domination, the rational coherence and the control of structural 
systems and to subvert all attempts to impose the alienating stamp of 
invariable sameness. They also sought to replace such systematic 8




structures with structures of their own-structures which define new 
spaces of non-conformity and freedom. (5) 
non solum . . . sed etiam: the mechanism of double inclusion is a classical 
trope which, like the mechanism of double exclusion excoriated by Barthes 
(cf. "La critique ni ni" in Mythologies), exhibits an addiction to emphase and 
redundancy (what would a variable sameness be?) which is as characteristic 
of the author's style as it is foreign to the texts she discusses. 
We never learn what these structures of their own might be, though this is 
a leitmotif of Bannet's admiration for these writers: 
They ruptured the constraints of language and genre to show that human 
subjects are not merely determined by language and by the conventions 
of writing; they are also free to create their own languages and to deter- 
mine their own conventions of writing. (259) 
Their rejection of the old Marxist ideal of unity of subject and object was 
counterbalanced by a new ideal of Otherness, and their rejections of 
semiology and structuralism by the creation of signs and structures of 
their own. (263). 
And their refusal of authority was more than countered by their inven- 
tion of structures to which all 'other' texts were ineluctably subjected. 
(263-64) 
They could be so inventive, presumably, because of their "blanket view of the 
fictionality of all texts" (231), a formula which blandly elides their resistance 
to any blanket view of what is a text and of what is fiction. 
Bannet's redundant formulations constantly feed on their own abstrac- 
tions, which are but meagerly nourished by a superficial equation between 
hastily concocted definitions of structuralism and of technocratic society. 
Alienation is the target of these writers' dissent, whose summary logic 
appears to embody a deft marketing strategy: "If the blanket term, aliena- 
tion, has come to seem rather old-fashioned to us today, it is in no small 
measure due to the efforts made by Lacan, Barthes, Foucault and Derrida to 
redefine it and deal with it in smaller and more manageable sections." (3) 
As we have already seen, Bannet's prose superabounds with the words 
"new" and "creative," often together-"And they use the different lan- 
guages of the human sciences-structural anthropology, cybernetics, 
Freudian psychology, linguistics, Marxism, existentialism, phenomenology, 
semiology, traditional logic, traditional rhetoric and explication de texte-as 
a medium, a vehicle, for their critique of modern man's condition and as ele- 
ments for a new creation of their own." (8)-as if in defiance of Barthes's far 
more fecund observation, which Bannet does not fail to cite (72), that there 9
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are "no creators, only combiners." Her capable review of the motifs of the 
series, the fragment and plurality in Barthes, does not save him from being 
museumized in Alphonse Daudet's Moulin, as we read in this Barnumesque 
conclusion: "Barthes' academic writer is a man who thinks 'of himself,' a man 
of culture and counter-culture, a realist and a dreamer, an imaginative creator 
and innovator who speaks of the past to speak to the present and who speaks 
to the present to influence the future in the certain knowledge that his words 
can help to create realities. Barthes' academic writer is a fictionalized ver- 
sion of himself" (93). 
Lacan fares no better from this kind of enthusiasm. For all the talk of 
structures, we learn nothing of the notorious triad Imaginary, Symbolic, Real. 
Alienation is traced to a "virtually complete take-over of perception, desire, 
imagination, thought, experience and reality by the symbolic order" (20) in a 
way that inspires the author to interpolate a feasible alternative: "Lacan 
aimed to make his students and analysands aware that they were controlled to 
the depths of their being by the other-by an alien symbolic, culture and 
social order which failed to satisfy their deepest needs and desires and which 
condemned real subjectivity to oblivion" (43-44). I underline the terms 
which have no place in Lacanian theory, even by tacit (unconscious?) admis- 
sion of the author, who quotes " 'The subject is no one,' " " 'The subject is 
nothing' " from the Seminars II and M. And as if Lacan did not build his 
theory on the ruins of American ego psychology, we find in him an apologist 
for a Romantic nostalgia for the self: 
And as Lacan saw it, the only remaining hope lay in reminding people 
that they were being turned into automata and in keeping alive the 
realisation that there was no longer any place in language and cuture for 
individuality, intersubjectivity and the humanist conception of man. For 
if people realized what was missing, if they became aware of their own 
profound desire for an existence they lacked, there might yet be a chance 
for regaining what they had lost. (45) 
Though we are never told why, Foucault receives as much attention as 
the three others combined. As a consequence perhaps, Barnet's glossy 
interpolations are compensated for by some more accurate resume. This does 
not protect Les Mots et les choses from the nostalgia motif: 
For in Les Mots et les choses Foucault reconstructs history to support 
an argument: the argument that the divided figure of man "invented" at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century is responsible for the antinomies 
and impasses of contemporary thought, and that these can be overcome 
by effacing the figure of man and by using a new episteme modelled on 
the Renaissance and Classical periods when man, in his present form, 
was not. (145) 10




While Foucault's reading of the human sciences does recall certain elements 
of Renaissance linguistics as our literature confronts us anew with "rare brut 
du langage," his insistence on epochal discontinuity does not encourage any 
return to the past for a model. And what are we to make of this reflection on 
"l'impense" in Foucault's writings? "Instead of trying to turn the Other into 
the Same, Foucault suggests we should allow the unthought to retain its 
Otherness and leave it where it is, outside thought." (155) Nothing, 
obviously. 
Foucault's challenge to the human sciences is reduced to the jolly 
skepticism of an Anatole France: "In Foucault, the finiteness of man's 
thought is not a tragic fate, but a comic celebration of the ridiculousness of 
human pretensions to universal knowledge and universal truth" (164). 
(Discipline and Punish? yuk! yuk!) The choice he imposes on intellectuals is 
phrased as follows: "whether to act as passive agents of the powers that be or 
as independent destroyers and creators of knowledge and truth" (183). 
"Powers that be" is a stock formula granting power an ontological status that 
flies in the face of Foucault's analytic of power as a network of relations and 
intersections, which Barnet has ably summarized a few pages earlier. At any 
rate we are well rid of his prestige if his vast and complicated projects are 
reducible to a long familiar and futile sociology of knowledge: 
The only way out, as far as Foucault is concerned, is to learn the lesson 
that the history of knowledge can teach: in showing that man's knowlege 
was empirically grounded in historical conditions, the history of knowl- 
edge also showed that its validity was limited to a particular historical 
episode. It thus undermined any knowledge's pretension to universality 
and made the relativity of knowledge its absolute. (159) 
One constantly has the impression that Bannet's own text is driven by an 
unconscious desire to find a way out from these authors, whose pessimism 
eludes or alarms her. 
As for Derrida, he is simply unrecognizable in these pages, which 
assimilate him to a position he has always combatted: "Difference can help to 
recuperate at least some of the irrecuperable origin if it is conceived in an 
additional way: not only as a separating interval, but also as a linking 
interval" (192); "Difference as the opening which lets all things appear is the 
One, the unique generator of the plurality of all that is" (194). It appears that a 
vaguely Lurianic cosmology informs differance or difference (we often cannot 
tell which the author means); it emerges as "a mysterious point of unity" 
(198), "a quasi-mystical coincidentia oppositorum (199; cf. Derrida to the 
contrary, resisting the "punctual simplicity" of this figure in "Plato's 
Pharmacy"). 
Compare what Bannet says about temporality and difference: 11
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Everything that is present now is always a re-presentation, a repetition 
of past presence. Because separated by differentiating intervals, every 
past present is also always other than and different from any present 
present, and the difference "which makes possible the presentation of 
the being present, never presents itself as such. It is never given in the 
present." (188) 
with what Derrida writes in "Differance": 
It is because of differance that the movement of signification is possible 
only if each so-called "present" element, each element appearing on the 
scene of presence, is related to something other than itself, thereby 
keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and already letting 
itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element, this 
trace being related no less to what is called the future than to what is 
called the past, and constituting what is called the present by means of 
this very relation to what it is not: what it absolutely is not, not even a 
past or a future as a modified present. ("Differance," Margins 13) 
For Derrida there is no present present or any past present either. If Bannet 
suggests the contrary, it is because she has yoked Derrida to just the 
ontological project he persistently challenges. Small wonder then that decon- 
struction comes out sounding like a renewed license to practice ontotheology: 
"Deconstruction is a displacement of the human constructs that have 
displaced the orignating unity. And it is an attempt to open out a metaphysic 
and a mind-set which have been closed to the wholly Other by carving out 
spaces or abysses in language and thought through which it can be glimpsed 
`through a glass darkly' " (184). 
In and out of all this we get some fairly accurate paraphrase of Derridean 
texts, but they only render statements like the following all the more 
astonishing: "According to Derrida, traces cover the whole field of being and 
all of time. The problem is how to return from this multiplicity of signals and 
pathways to the God who has passed." (193). This is a problem for the 
author, not Derrida, whom we have welcomed in part as an antidote to 
absurdist bathos about "the bottomless void, the abyss, the darkness on the 
face of the deep" (200). 
The author's conclusion follows the same pattern. Where she does not 
flatly contradict the utterances of her subjects, she prunes them back to 
banalities about "freedom of thought and freedom of discourse" (257), about 
their opposition to "the new de-personalised, de-individualised mass society" 
(236), as we find them "preaching a de-centralisation, a pluralism, a freedom 
to be different and to makes one's differences felt, which are familiar to every 12




American" (232). That homely note is struck again with reference to our 
"university system . . . where the freedom to `originalise' oneself already 
exists if one is willing and able to do so" (261). Never mind Foucault's 
analytic of "pouvoir," Lacan's of "vouloir": we are free to be you and me. 
This is indeed a very American book. What makes it so is its compul- 
sively upbeat tautologies and slapdash synthesis, its resolute inconsistency 
and nebulous optimism and a concomitant allergy to critical or speculative 
rigor. These are habits which Tocqueville first warned us about, which 
Sinclair Lewis (our Flaubert) made such delicious fun of, and which Barthes 
for one stigmatized as anti-intellectual (cf. "Racine est Racine" in 
Mythologies). At the very least we imbibe these heady French imports in 
order to chasten such practices if not, because of structural constraints they 
induce us to understand, to eradicate them. Failing such effort, we get a book 
like this, which reads like an unconscious paean to bourgeois liberalism, 
whose emancipatory individualism goes unquestioned. There may be nothing 
intrinsically reprehensible in that, but in a book about intellectuals it is 
undeniably all the more reprehensible for being unconscious. 
Andrew J. McKenna 
Loyola University of Chicago 
Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, eds. Rethinking Bakhtin: Exten- 
sions and Challenges. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1989. 
This collection consists of eight articles, an extended polemical intro- 
duction by the editors, and an appendix which includes Emerson's transla- 
tions of Bakhtin's introductions to two volumes of the 1929 complete edition 
of Tolstoy's work. Six of the articles have already appeared elsewhere: 
Morson's "Parody, History and Metaparody" in The Boundaries of Genre 
(Austin, 1981); Linda Hutcheon's "Modern Parody and Bakhtin" in A 
Theory of Parody (London: Methuen, 1985); de Man's "Dialogue and 
Dialogism" in Poetics Today 4:1 (1983); Ann Shulman' s " Bakhtin's Tolstoy 
Prefaces" excerpted from "Bakhtin and Tolstoy" in Studies in 7Wentieth- 
Century Literature 9 (1984); Emerson's revised "The Tolstoy Connection in 
Bakhtin" which appeared in PMLA 100 (1985); and Aaron Fogel's 
"Coerced Speech and the Oedipus Dialogue Complex" in his Coercion to 
Speak: Conrad's Poetics of Dialogue (Cambridge, 1985). 
The articles which appear for the first time include Morson's and Emer- 
son's extensive introduction (it is the longest of any of the articles included in 
the volume), Mathew Roberts' "Poetics Hermeneutics Dialogics: Bakhtin 
and Paul de Man," Michael Andre Bernstein's "The Poetics of Ressenti- 13
et al.: Reviews
Published by New Prairie Press
314 STCL, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer, 1990) 
ment," and the Emerson translations. These materials make the greatest 
impression, and constitute more than half of the volume. 
There is virtue in bringing together a wide variety of articles on Bakhtin, 
especially when the task, as the editors claim in their subtitle, is to "extend" 
and "challenge" Bakhtin's theories of parody, dialogism, and utterance. But 
this is not the only task. Morson and Emerson "challenge" interpretations of 
Bakhtin they believe do not do him justice. Thus, the volume is highly 
polemical. It should be emphasized, however, that the polemic does not occur 
within a Bakhtinian design. Where Bakhtin renders judgments tentatively, 
with allowance for other perspectives, and with a consciousness of the 
openendedness and unfmalizability of dialogue, Morson and Emerson 
engage in what they themselves describe as the tendency of "defenders of the 
great proponent of dialogue" to "[monologize] a deeply dialogic relation- 
ship" (48). Their primary target is the Clark and Holquist biography of 
Bakhtin, particularly their contention that Bakhtin's writing is all of a piece. 
Morson and Clark illustrate how much Bakhtin's thinking evolved over time. 
Particularly useful is their treatment of Bakhtin's "The Philosophy of the 
Act," an early text which precedes his work on language, the word, dialogue 
and utterance. 
Morson and Emerson advance their theory of the "disputed texts," 
Voloshinov's Marxism and the Philosophy of Language and Freudianism: 
A Critical Sketch as well as Medvedev's The Formal Method in Literary 
Scholarship. Their judgment is unequivocal-these are not Bakhtin's. The 
thrust of the argument is against Clark's and Holquist's claim to the contrary, 
and the editors go to great lengths to expose the biographers' position for its 
basis both in hearsay and the questionable recollections on the part of 
Bakhtin's colleagues and their families. For their part, Morson and Emerson 
base their argument both on historical evidence (here the presentation is 
strongest) and on conjecture (e.g., "Moreover, if Bakhtin was himself 
influenced by Medvedev's books, as we suspect, his wife may have copied 
extensive parts of it as notes," 36). 
The articles included in the volume appear under the two headings of the 
subtitle: extensions (Morson's and Hutcheon's work on parody as well as de 
Man's note on dialogue and Roberts' response to de Man); and challenges 
(Shukman's and Emerson's contributions on Bakhtin's Tolstoy as well as 
Fogel's and Bemstein's essays on the dangers of dialogic theory). This is a 
rather artificial division in that challenges to Bakhtin's theories and exten- 
sions of them appear in each of the eight articles. 
The articles excerpted from longer studies suffer the most from a lack of 
editing. It is not uncommon to fmd comments of the type, "We have here an 
instance of a semiotic universal which I have often had occasion to describe in 
this study" (73). Unfortunately, the study to which Morson refers is his book, 14




not the excerpted chapter on parody he includes in this volume. There are a 
total of four such references in his article; another four appear in the Hutcheon 
article (see pages 68, 74, 77, 94, 95, 97 and 98). The essay most severely 
damaged in the transition from its original presentation to this volume is Ann 
Shukman's. It is only half the length of the original, a regrettable fact given the 
value of the original and the resulting truncation of the argument in this 
collection. 
Morson's excerpt is at its best when interpreting parody and history. For 
those familiar with The Boundaries of Genre, pleasure is to be derived from 
rereading his incisive comments on Pushkin (80, 82) and Dostoesvky (83- 
84). Hutcheon's excerpt is valuable in its rendering an extended definition of 
Bakhtin's idea of parody: "complex forms of 'trans-contextualization' and 
inversion" (97). She opens up the definition of the genre by claiming that 
"any codified discourse is open to parody." Of particular value is her differen- 
tiation of parody from closely related discourse modes (satire, for example). 
But her discovery that parody contains an emphasis on a norm against which 
it reacts (foreground to background), is neither new nor an extension of 
Bakthin's definition (100). 
Paul de Man's brief essay mounts a challenge to Bakhtin's dialogism: 
"The ideologies of otherness and of hermeneutic understanding are not com- 
patible, and therefore their relationship is not a dialogical but simply a con- 
tradictory one. It is not a foregone conclusion whether Bakthin's discourse is 
itself dialogical or simply contradictory" (112). This is an issue hotly con- 
tested by those who follow Bakhtin's writing (in this volume, Morson and 
Emerson). De Man cautions: "To imitate or to apply Bakhtin, to read him by 
engaging him in a dialogue, betrays what is most valid in his work" (114). 
What is one, then, to do with his "relationship" to Bakhtin? For de Man, the 
limitations are clear: "Dialogism is . . . still a descriptive and metalinguistic 
term that says something about language rather than about the world" (108), 
a distinction that separates de Man's discourse from Bakthin's in absolute 
terms. This is the topic of Mathew Roberts' article, which neither extends nor 
challenges Bakthin's theories. Rather, it attempts to set de Man's remarks in 
context. Roberts traces the differences in the two theoreticians' writing along 
several axes, the most fundamental of which is the idea of the "self" in its rela- 
tionship to the world (and what is knowable in it). Roberts concludes that the 
force of de Man's deconstructionist critique of Bakhtin is to render up not the 
object (Bakhtin's epistemology), but to engage in a distinct type of discourse 
through which its own presuppositions are displayed. He concludes, "Such 
an objection [as mine] cannot . . . 'refute' de Man's critique of Bakthin. It can 
only demonstrate . . . the mutual unintelligibility of their perspectives on 
meaning" (134). 
The second half of the volume contains the four articles ostensibly chal- 15
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lenging Bakhtin's theories. Shukman's, through no fault of her own, makes the 
least interesting reading. Its finest moments treat several points of contiguity 
between Tolstoy's and Bakhtin's thinking on the subject's relationship to evil. 
The points of contact between the two indicate that "Bakhtin was using 
Tolstoy's thesis [on sin and redemption] to present his own personal posi- 
tion" (146). Emerson's article on Bakhtin's Tolstoy, however, delivers some 
of the most engaging rereading of the collection. Emerson treats three central 
issues relative to Bakhtin's interpretation of Tolstoy and Dostoesvky. First, 
she discusses the orientation toward monologism in the former and dialogism 
in the latter, focusing on the virtues each allows within the worlds created by 
these two literary giants. Favor is given to Dostoevsky's representation of 
multiple consciousnesses. Second, Emerson treats monologism and 
dialogism from the Bakhtinian perspective of relations between authors and 
their heroes. Particularly useful here are her evaluations of the Other in 
forming an adequate image of the self and of language as a medium of truth 
seeking (Tolstoy) rather than a problem of truth seeking (Dostoevsky). The 
third issue treated has to do with the amount of Otherness necessary for the 
formation of a self. The centrality of death in Tolstoy's work is emphasized 
here. Bakhtin rejects Tolstoy's idea that the self is completed in death by the 
subject him/herself. For Bakhtin, the fmalizability of the self occurs through 
the agency of the Other's perspective on the subject's death: "No self, not 
even our own, can be controlled or created from within; we can only be com- 
pleted from without" (163). Extracting herself from the force of Bakhtin's 
critique, Emerson concludes that Bakhtin was "not a particularly good reader 
of Tolstoy" (168) for the simple reason that the "Bakhtinian model . . . does 
not really allow for any investigation of the Tolstoyan sense of self" (169). 
Fogel's discussion of coerced speech in Conrad's fiction represents an 
emphatic challenge to Bakhtin's presuppositions. He discloses the degree to 
which Bakhtin's discourse typologies and the dialogic relations which they 
describe leave out potentially harmful features: the "identification of all 
dialogic relations as disproportionate and imperial" (179). The infelicitous 
aspects of dialogue, which Bakhtin does not treat, are underscored in Conrad, 
thus challenging Bakhtin's original idea at the point where speech is forced 
from the interlocutor: "Bakhtin necessarily, in studying Dostoevsky, used 
[anacrisis] to mean the ingenious strategies of verbal pressure to speak, but 
the dictionaries remind us that in its origins it refers more often to examina- 
tion by extreme physical torture" (188). Conrad's work thematizes this 
aspect of dialogue and moves away from Bakhtin's "dialogic of 'sympathy' " 
(193) toward the politics of a hierarchically organized, coercive dialogue of 
authority. 
The dark potential of Bakthin's discourse theories is subject to intense 
scrutiny and offers the most substantive challenge to his work. Bemstein's 16




deconstructionist critique of those theories appropriately concludes the 
essays. If there was ever any hope that Bakhtin's ideas might challenge decon- 
structionist technique, Bernstein dispels it roundly. Focusing on narratives of 
ressentiment ("reminiscence-as-suffering"), Bernstein exposes Bakhtin's 
discourse types to a harsh critical light. From the perspective of the Under- 
ground Man, Bernstein treats the problem of citation as central to ressenti- 
ment experienced by such diverse characters as Diderot's Rameau and 
Flaubert's Bouvard and Pecuchet, and as presented by authors as distinct 
from each other as Celine and Schiller. Connecting memory with the problem 
of citation and an overall inability to deliver a unique word (or perspective), 
Bernstein emphasizes that dialogism represents "part of the solution to the 
crisis of reminiscence" and "part of the problem as well" (223). 
In sum, this collection of essays and translations is both instructive and 
annoying. On the one hand, the volume could have used more extensive 
editing (especially of the many excerpted reprints) and the Shukman article 
should have been either omitted or printed in full. On the other hand, the Bern- 
stein and Fogel articles command the greatest attention if only because they 
indeed represent a most thorough challenge to Bakhtin's theories of dialogue 
and discourse. These readings are insightful. Additionally, the Emerson 
translations of Bakhtin's introductions to Tolstoy are as finely crafted as any 
of her expert and sensitive renderings of Bakhtin's writing. Her annotations 
are instructive and precise. 
Lewis Bagby 
University of Wyoming 
Fernando Moreno. Carlos Fuentes. La mort d'Artemio Cruz: entre le mythe 
et l'histoire. Paris: Editions Caribeennes, 1989. 
Although published as part of the Collection Tropismes, a series of 
critical studies prepared for students, teachers, and the general public, 
Moreno's book has much to offer the literary specialist as well. 
The study consists of four integrated parts: "Textes et contextes"; 
"Histoire et reek" (narrative structure); "Revivre l'histoire, vivre dans 
l'histoire" (historical vision of Artemio Cruz); "Les signes, les symboles, les 
mythes." Moreno begins with a useful survey of Fuentes' other texts through 
Cristobal Nonato (1987). He sets La muerte de Artemio Cruz in the literary 
contexts of the "new Latin American novel" and the "novel of the Mexican 
Revolution." He observes that Fuentes, like other writers who brought 
unprecedented international recognition to the Latin American novel in the 
early sixties, has kept on writing about Latin American identity, and that as a 17
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Mexican writer he is especially concerned with the continuing impact the 
Revolution has had on his country and its people. In his consideration of 
intertextuality in La muerte de Artemio Cruz, Moreno not only reviews the 
creative connection with commonly mentioned works in literature and 
cinema by figures such as Joyce, Faulkner, Lowry, Builuel, Welles, he also 
makes a good case for including Herman Broch's La mort de Virgile (The 
Death of Virgil 1945) and Salvador Novo's El joven, the novel of 1928 and 
the play of 1951. 
At the end of the first section of the study, Moreno focuses on the topic of 
death: the Mexican preoccupation with death, the creative aspect of death, 
and death's privileged position in Fuentes' novel. He continues the explora- 
tion of death, now as a structural motif, in part two, his explanation of the 
structure of the novel, histoire transformed as recit. Even before the begin- 
ning of the story, he explicates the connection between Fuentes' text and the 
series of five epigraphs that introduce it. The epigraphs, taken from essay, 
play, novel, poem, and song, refer to attitudes toward death: "La serie des 
epigraphes devient ainsi un résumé des differentes attitudes et opinions 
autour de la mort telles qu'elles ont pu se manifester a travers tous les 'genres' 
qui materialisent in fonction poetique du langage . . ." (32-33). 
As Moreno expands "death" into "deaths," real and symbolic deaths 
witnessed or caused by Artemio Cruz, he identifies the life/death opposition 
that evokes tension within the text: "l'on peut verifier la presence d'une 
double orientation, de deux mouvements qui s'opposent et s'affrontent, l'un 
qui tend vers la mort, l'inactivite, la fin, l'autre qui pousse a la vie, l'action, le 
commencement. Contrastent donc la passivite et le dynamisme . ." (37-38). 
In the fragmented total world of Artemio Cruz, life and death are interdepen- 
dent; the projection grammatically and conceptually of past as future 
interrupts the closing of a cycle by offering the possibility of a different ver- 
sion of the past and therefore a different version of the present based on that 
past. The reader familiar with Fuentes' other works may recall his treatment 
of text and history in Cambio de piel (1967) and Terra Nostra (1975). 
Because many of the themes and strategies identified in La muerte de 
Artemio Cruz are those that run through all of Fuentes' fiction, Moreno's 
review of the grammatical shifting that creates the complex movement of the 
narration and his discussions of strategies, such as Fuentes' use of patterns 
based on the numbers two and three or the repetition of gestures and phrases, 
often suggest aspects of Fuentes' later works. 
In the second part Moreno also traces the symmetry in Fuentes' arrange- 
ment of the twelve dated fragments and shows that episodes offering an oppor- 
tunity for authentic action are juxtaposed with episodes involving a choice 
leading to moral degradation (64). Then, in part three, "Revivre l'histoire, 
vivre dans l'histoire," he turns attention to Fuentes' complex treatment of 18




time. Again touching on elements that were to appear in Fuentes' later fic- 
tion, he explores the narrative functions of memory, dream, choice, love, and 
ambiguity and discusses the strategies of doubling and reflecting (as in 
mirrors). 
Moreno's summary of the historical setting of the novel takes the reader 
through the history associated with Artemio Cruz from the mid-nineteenth 
century to 1959. Within the long series of usurpations of power by the 
caciques and caudillos filing and circling through Mexican history, Artemio 
is the ching6n, emerged from Artemio the child, el chingado, son of la 
chingada. Here, Moreno, following other critics, explains Fuentes' ties to the 
ideas of Octavio Paz in the portrayal of Mexican identity. 
Moreno looks at the relationship of chronological time to mythic time, or 
timelessness, in the novel. He points out Fuentes' incorporation of cosmic 
cycles of the Aztec calendar and his references to classical myths, and dis- 
cusses Fuentes' further use of numerology and symbolism of names. He 
relates Artemio's struggle with the concept of la chingada to Fuentes' con- 
cerns about language and the need to find a meaning in words that will create a 
different way of expressing, thus experiencing, the universe. Referring to 
alternative realities contained in words, he quotes Fuentes from Cervantes o 
la critica de la lectura: "chaque mot, sous son apparence de vacuite, con- 
tient tous les germes d'une renovation, `tous les echos d'une memoire 
ancestrale, origenelle, fondatrice' " (137). In his final remarks he reviews the 
reflections, oppositions, and contradictions at work within the multi-faceted 
existence of Artemio Cruz, the forces creating the paradoxes that drive the 
dynamic movement of the novel and make it unique. 
The book's cover reports that Moreno is a lecturer in Spanish at the 
University of Poitiers and Secretaire General of the Center for Latin Ameri- 
can Research. He has written extensively about Latin American literature. 
The present study demonstrates that he is well-versed in Mexican culture and 
in the history and myths that have contributed to the development of a 
Mexican identity. His sound literary and historical background as well as his 
careful analysis make this volume one of the most valuable critical studies of 
Fuentes' work published to date. The numerous bibliographical items 
appearing in Moreno's notes at the ends of chapters and in a formal 
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